Consideration means reciprocity, because both parties give something in exchange for something else. Chen-Wishart argues that this reciprocity subsequently justifies contractual remedies in accordance with the standby measure if the contract is not performed, since the party has given something to benefit from these remedies (Contract Formation and Parties, chap. 5). Atiyah agrees with this role of reciprocal performance, but he also interprets the concept of consideration as a reason to keep the promise (Essays on Contract, Essay 8). It also includes in those grounds erroneous elements, which it considers to form part of the general balancing rule and not merely as exceptions to it. Such a broad interpretation of the notion of consideration is not desirable because it obscures the fact that the questions of whether there has been consideration and whether there is a reason for not performing the promise despite the existence of consideration are two different issues (Treitel (1976) 50 A.L.J. 439). The recital must therefore be interpreted more restrictively, but nevertheless as a justification function. The possibility of using coercion to replace certain aspects of the audit was considered in light of the comments of the judges in Williams v.

Roffey Bros., in particular Chief Justice Glidewell, who suggested that if Stilk v. Myrick were now reconsidered, it would be an economic coercion case, and Purcas J.A., who noted that “modern business depends more on defending coercion in a commercial context than on ignoring consideration.” The meaning of coercion replacing consideration is that, although an agreement without consideration is considered null and void, coercion renders a contract voidable (and voids). However, McKendrick believes that a balance must be struck between consideration and coercion, since the consideration is about “renegotiation of a contract and coercion governs the fairness of renegotiation.” (d) Partial payment of a debt is not a good consideration, but partial performance of an existing contractual obligation is a good consideration. The doctrine of intention to create legal relationships is based on (objectively) reflecting the true intentions of the parties at the time of conclusion of the contract. The principle aims to distinguish between social agreements (where there is a rebuttable presumption that there is no intention to establish legal relations) and commercial agreements (where there is a presumption to the contrary). Chief Justice Russell`s approach in Williams v. Roffey Bros. seems to support the idea that consideration could be part of (or superseded) the intention to create legal relationships. However, if the consideration were upheld, Williams v. Roffey Bros. could still be considered a case of coercion or an example where promissory estoppel can be used as a cause of action. The main advantage of the intention to create legal relationships to enforce contracts would be legal certainty (evidenced by the distinction between social and economic), but Mindy Chen-Wishart noted that there are several difficulties in using this doctrine in the same way as in taking it into account, namely the problem of the performance of gratuitous commitments and the belief that the replacement of consideration by intention “would simply require they decide which promises should be enforceable.” Commercial context Where an express agreement is concluded in a commercial context, the burden of proving that there was no intention to establish a legal relationship rests largely with the party relying on it.

If it is alleged that an implied agreement was entered into in the commercial context, the onus is on the party claiming the existence of the contract to prove that the intention was to establish a legal relationship (i.e., the presumption that there is an intention to create a legal relationship in a commercial context only applies if there is an express agreement (Baird Textile v. M&S [2001], where M&S had no intention of legal relations as not being a long-term agreement. Mance LJ: This case shows that the “commercial” presumption of enforceability can only apply if the court can first make an “express” or “apparent” promise.) Explicit exclusion of the presumption of exchange The presumption is rebutted if the agreement expressly provides that there is no intention to establish legal relations. Examples include: (a) the “honest promise” clause, which makes it clear that the agreement is not a legal arrangement. (b) 2. Athletes and sports federations: In Modahl v. British Athletic [2001] (defendant for breach of contract and damages for costs and loss of income during the period of suspension from competition, on the ground that the defendant failed to comply with an implied obligation to take all reasonable steps to ensure that the members of the Disciplinary Committee were free from bias and that the applicant would receive a fair and impartial trial), CA has ruled that there can be a contract between an athlete and its governing body, even if it has never been officially recognized.